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Abstract
In this essay I assess the role that is played by the two characteristics of high−tech firms in
shaping their corporate strategies: short product cycles and the involvement of intangible
assets in production. Short product cycles impose high−tech firms to seek complementary
assets for entering new markets quickly and compete. The involvement of intangible capital
in high−tech production, on the other hand, is related to the distinguishing characteristic of
high−tech industries for which RDactivities are observed frequently and firms employ a large
proportion of scientists, engineers and technicians. In this essay, I hypothesize and show that
as a result of these two characteristics high−technology firms are likely to engage in vertical
mergers more often than low−technology firms and vertical mergers are likely to involve
firms that employ intangible assets in production.
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1.0 Introduction 
   Economic implications of mergers and acquisitions have long been an interest to 
economists. A merger by definition combines two firms leaving one surviving firm. An 
acquisition, on the other hand, describes the purchase of one firm by another. In this 
essay, I employ the term “merger” to identify both mergers and acquisitions.  
Mergers are also often classified based on the type of merging firms’ activities as 
vertical, horizontal and conglomerate. As explained subsequently, this distinction is a 
critical part of this study. A merger is classified as vertical if integrating firms belong to 
the neighboring stages of production such as a wine maker purchasing a bottle or cork 
factory. A horizontal merger on the other hand describes the case  where firms who are 
involved in the same business line get together and form a separate firm. The third 
category of mergers are called conglomerate and they occur between firms with unrelated 
lines of business. 
Motivations behind mergers have been studied  under several headings in the 
literature. In this essay, my main interest is to distinguish between high and low 
technology industry behavior related to mergers, a topic which is left out in the literature. 
A systematic analysis on this subject is extremely useful for understanding the corporate 
strategy of high-technology firms, which is largely induced by their willingness to stay 
innovative.  
  High-technology firms show different behavioral characteristics in comparison to 
firms in other industries. For  the purposes of this essay, two of these characteristics are 
particularly significant. First, firms in high-technology industries engage in R&D 
activities much more frequently than the firm in low-technology industries (Audretsch 
and Feldman, 1996). As an  implication of this, firms in these industries employ a larger 
proportion of scientists, engineers and technicians in comparison to the firms in other 
manufacturing industries (Dung, 1990). Secondly, firms in high-tech industries face short 
product cycles. As a consequence of this, these firms find themselves engaging in various 
types of vertical agreements or contracts with others in order to access complementary 
assets and thus bring new products to the market. For example, frequently no one single 
firm d oes both the design and production of semi-conductor chips but rather firms enter 
into agreements to bring the new chip to the market.    2
One of the implications of the first set of characteristics is that high-tech firms are 
likely to employ intangible or t acit assets 
1 more intensely in comparison to firms in 
other industries. In this essay, I consider only tacit-knowledge and describe it as the skills 
of engineers, mathematicians and technicians who are employed to achieve a particular 
task in the research or development phase of a product. Winter describes skills as a 
specified and defined set of capabilities applied to a particular task As reported in Winter 
(1987), Polanyi (1958), on the other hand, describes tacitness as a situation where the 
person who owns the skill can not provide as useful explanation of the rules to achieve a 
task.  
The specific measure of tacit-knowledge that is employed in this study is justified 
in two ways. First of all the literature on tacit-knowledge describes activities that involve 
design, research, development, setting up, operating and maintaining laboratory 
instruments and equipment and alike as involving tacit knowledge. These skills are also 
described as the primary skills of engineers, scientists  and technicians in the 
Occupational Outlook Handbook which is a product of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The handbook provides detailed description of the existing occupations under each 
industry category in U.S. In the empirical part of this essay, I rank different stages of 
production in the Semiconductors Industry by the involvement of skilled labor. Features 
of this industry is deeply analyzed in the literature and this allows me access such 
information without having to collect data.  
A critical aspect of tacit knowledge is the complexity that is involved in its 
exchange which originates from the difficulty of measuring and valuing this type of asset. 
As reported in Fortune Magazine, 1991, for example, Dennis Yablonsky, CEO of 
Carnegie Group explains this feature clearly: “Knowledge has been too hard to get to”, he 
explains “it’s in people’s heads its unstructured”.  
Alchian and Woodward (1988) point the difficulty of exchanging such assets 
through contracts. Specifically, authors claim that some assets are more vulnerable to 
moral hazardous exploitation than others. In order to explain this, the authors compare a 
drug research laboratory with a steel manufacturer and conjecture that there are fewer 
options for discretionary firm behavior in steel manufacturing. Hence, the authors 
conclude, this increases the costs that are related to the detection of care or moral hazard   3
that is likely to induce the owner also to be the user of the asset. For example, Krickx 
(1995) finds that computer firms’ tendency to integrate has increased as computer logic 
components have shifted from relatively simple ones such as receiving tubes to 
technologically complex integrated circuits. The difficulty with the exchange of tacit 
knowledge lies in its characteristics: it is difficult to specify the characteristics of such 
knowledge ex-ante, it is difficult to observe individual efforts and output is not verifiable 
by third parties ex-post.  
Hence, based on the above discussion, I claim that firms from high-tech industries 
are l ikely to engage in vertical mergers more often than the firms from other industries. 
Specifically, I argue that low-technology firms face different production characteristics in 
comparison to low-tech firms that induce them to use pricing strategies as opposed to 
performance. And hence, they are more likely to engage in horizontal mergers. 
Horizontal mergers are much less frequently discussed in connection to innovation which 
is the core strategy for high-tech firms to stay in the market and compete. Most 
discussion on horizontal mergers is on anti-trust issues and price collusion. Inefficiencies 
related to monopolistic structures which are created as a result of horizontal mergers have 
been the major target of most academic discussion. Of course, following  the 
Schumpeterian conjectures (Winter and Nelson, 1982) one could argue that monopolies 
have a larger incentive to innovate and they also can benefit from internal returns to 
scale. It is not, however, clear at all that large firms and firms that face less competition 
have a higher propensity to innovate. As Geroski (1991) indicates: " The correlation 
between size and innovation is weak, and that between market concentration and 
innovation is tenuous at best". 
Complementary to the above hypothesis, I also claim that because product cycles 
are short, vertical mergers in high-tech industries are likely to involve tacit assets more 
intensely in comparison to horizontal mergers. This is because vertical mergers are likely 
to occur between firms that strategize t o access complementary assets involving the tacit 
knowledge of other firms and secondly these firms are likely to merge to further engage 
in R&D by combining their complementary assets. Forming horizontal mergers on the 
other hand is less likely to be considered as a strategy that is used for R&D. 
Hence, the two core hypotheses in this study can be summarized as follows:   4
Hypothesis 1 : High-tech firms engage in vertical mergers more frequently than 
the firms in low-tech industries. 
Hypothesis 2 : Firms in high-tech industries engage in vertical mergers more 
frequently as opposed to horizontal mergers when at least one firm in the merger owns 
tacit-skills (knowledge). 
In order to test these two hypotheses I employ the Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database for the t ime period 1993-1998. I examine a total of 1025 mergers across two 
low-technology industries, Stone Clay, Glass and Concrete Product and Food and 
Kindred Products and one high-tech industry, Electronic and Electrical Equipment and 
Components Sector.  
In the next section, I describe the specifics of the manufacturing process in 
Semiconductors industry, a sub-sector of Electronics Industry. In section 3, I summarize 
the data and the results and conclude with some remarks.                                                                                                                     
2.0 Semiconductors Industry                                                                                                                            
     Semiconductors or as often called microelectronics sector (SIC 3674) is a sub-
sector of Electronic Components  industry which is the subsector of the Electronic and 
Electrical Equipment and Components Industry. 
As reported in Stein et al. (1985), Semiconductors industry has t hree phases of 
product development and manufacture that require varying skill levels. The initial phase 
i.e. product development is synonymous with the research and development or design 
phase of production. And it includes the following activities: 
1-Original conception. This activity includes ascertaining whether a market exists 
2-Activities that involve extremely complex circuit design and engineering to 
meet the given product specifications. 
3-Prototype production in order to refine and correct the design and to adjust the 
manufacturing process so that it will produce satisfactory yields. 
     As reported in Stein et al., at this initial stage, the success of production 
depends heavily on skilled-labor employment. Therefore, I claim that given the intensity 
of tacit knowledge, agreements between firms that are at the design stage of production 
are likely to involve partner cheating.   5
The second phase involves activities related to wafer fabrication. As reported in 
Stein et al., in this phase chemical and p hysical processes are used to embed a circuit 
design in silicon wafer from 2 to 10 centimers in diameter. Many individual circuits are 
tested by machine and then each circuit is mechanically cut out from the wafer. Circuits 
that pass the tests for quality  control then progress to the third and final phase of 
production which is known as assembly (Stein et al.). Wafer production stage involves 
relatively less skilled labor employment. According to Stein et al. at this stage the skilled 
labor requirement in c omparison to the first stage is 2 to 1. Hence, I hypothesize that 
when firms are involved at this stage of production the risk of partner cheating is much 
lower as compared to the first stage.  
As reported in Stein at al., at the assembly stage, each circuit is encassed in a 
plastic or ceramic package, and tiny wires are welded to the circuit and to metal alloy 
leads or pins embedded in the package. These packages can then be plugged into circuit 
boards to perform their required function. As Stein et al. indicate "the assembly process is 
highly repetitive, requiring little technology, equipment or skill". Therefore, I claim that 
when firms are involved at the assembly stage, the risk of partner cheating is much lower 
as compared to the first two stages of production. 
As Stein et al. note as a whole the industry is largely dependent on highly skilled 
scientific and engineering workforce. However, the degree of this dependence increases 
as one moves from assembly to the design stage.  
3.0 Data and Results 
    To test the hypotheses that are stated in Section 1, I employ the Merger's and 
Acquisitions database for the time period 1993-1997 and the first two months of 1998. 
The data is published in the Mergers and Acquisitions Magazine which belongs to a 
private enterprise, IDD, in New York City. I choose this particular time period, as the 
data includes more explicit information on the primary business of firms starting with the 
first quarter of 1993. In addition, this time period does not involve structural changes 
such as changes in the Anti-trust law as in 1984 or political administration.                                                                            
The data is published quarterly for the period 1993-1994 and bi-monthly after 
that. I aggregate the b i-monthly data to obtain quarterly information. I choose one high-
tech and two low-tech industries to carry this exercise. The low-tech industries are: Food   6
And Kindred Products and Stone, Clay and Glass Products Industries. The high-tech 
industry is Electric and Electronic Equipment And Components Industry. The low and 
high technology Industry classifications are made based on the previous work done in 
this subject area.  The chosen industries are those for which there is no controversy as to 
what  industry category they belong . 
In order test the hypotheses, I classify each merger as vertical, horizontal and 
otherwise by the following  criteria. This classification is similar to those in the literature 
such as Tirole (1988) and Stein et al. (1985). An example to such classification is 
illustrated in Table 1.  
A merger is horizontal if the acquirer and acquired business are described by 
identical or close to identical phrases. All mergers where the majority of the business 
activities match and when two business activities are not complementary are also 
horizontal. 
A merger is vertical when the acquired and acquirer activities are complementary. 
I classify the two business activities as complementary if they can be identified as 
adjacent parts of a production  process. There are cases where merging firms' business 
activities are various and that each firm’s activity can be both complementary and 
horizontal. In this case, I determine the major business activity of each firm and then 
decide which category the merger fits in. 
All other mergers which do not fit to the above criteria are considered in the  
"Other" category 
In order to test the first hypothesis, I count the mergers and acquisitions for all 
three industries based on this classification and find the percentage of horizontal versus 
vertical mergers in high and low-tech industries. Table 2 illustrates the results of this 
exercise. The results indicate that the high-tech sector has the highest number of mergers 
and is followed by the Food and Kindred Products and Stone, Clay and Glass Products 
sectors. Further, the high-tech sector has the highest percentage of vertical mergers. And 
it is followed by the Stone, Clay and Glass products and Food and Kindred products 
sectors. The observed percentages of vertical and horizontal mergers are quite stable over 
the years for all three industries.   7
In order to test the second hypothesis, I concentrate on the Semiconductors and 
related devices industry. I examine the business activities of each company for each 
merger in this industry. Based on my knowledge on the intensity of required skills for 
each stage of production in this industry, I classify transactions as involving tacit versus 
non-tacit activities. In order to simplify the analysis, I consider only the design s tage 
activities as being tacit and adjust the classification accordingly. Further, I assume that 
the risk of partner cheating for agreements where one of the firms as opposed to both 
being engaged in tacit intense activities are identical.  
The results of this exercise are in Tables 2 and 3 and they provide strong support 
for the second hypothesis. This simple exercise provides support for the separate ways of 
corporate re-structuring between the high and low technology firms. This is likely to have 
important implications in industrial organization theory and in practice on issues that 
involve anti-trust policy. A statistically more involved exercise is desirable to support and 
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Appendix 
Notes: 
1- The literature on tacit knowledge has ample ways to describe this concept. In this 
essay, I employ the most generic definition i.e. knowledge embodied in human capital. 
Hence skills are a good measure following this definition. Below, is an example for the 
tacitness classification which is entirely based on the definition of production stages in 
Section 2.0 
 
Ilustrative Examples to Tacitness Classification  
 
 
SEMICONDUCTORS AND RELATED DEVICES (SIC 3674) 
An example to a merger where the Target Business activities involve highly tacit 
assets 
Acquirer: Helionetics Inc.  
Irvine, CA 
Acquired: Acculase Inc. (additional 67.5 %) 
San Diego, CA 
Terms:  Helionetics acquired a majority in Acculase for an undisclosed amount of 
common shares. Heliotenics raised its holdings to  more than 75% from its initial 7.5 % 
stake by acquiring securities 
  Completed: 4/18/94 
Acquirer Business: Electronic converters and lasers 
Programs   
Target Business: Semiconductors and related products 
 
SEMICONDUCTORS AND RELATED DEVICES (SIC 3674) 
An example to a merger where the Acquirer Business activities involve moderately 
tacit assets 
 
Acquirer:  MEMC Electronic Materials Inc. 
St. Peters, MO 
Acquired: Albemarle Corp. (Electronic Materials Business) 
Baton Rouge, LA 
Terms:  MEMC Electronic Materials, c ontrolled by VEBA AG Germany, acquired the 
electronic materials business of Albemarle for $ 47 million cash. 
Completed: 7/31/95 
Acquirer Business: Silicon wafers 
Target Business: Polysilicon material   9
 
     Illustrative Examples to Merger Classification:  
Table 1 
 
An example to a Horizontal Merger  
SIC 3625 RELAYS AND INDUSTRIAL CONTROLS  
Acquirer: Ansoft Corp. 
Pittsburgh, PA 
Target: MacNeal- Schwendler Corp. (Electromagnetics analysis business) 
Terms: Ansoft acquired the electromagnetics analysis business of MacNeal 
Schwendler for $ 5.6 million 
Completed: 7/25/96 
Acquirer Business: Electromagnetic Engineering Software 
Target Business: Electromagnetic software 
 
An example to a Merger in the "Other" Category 
SIC3675 PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS 
Acquirer: Pacific Animated Imaging Inc. 
Annapolis, MD 
Target: U.S. Technologies Inc. 
Austin, Texas 
Terms: Pacific Animated Imaging acquired U.S. Technologies for an undisclosed 
amount of common shares 
Completed: 7/25/96 
Acquirer Business: Imaging Systems 
Target Business: Printed Circuit Boards 
 
An Example to a Vertical Merger  
SIC3674 SEMICONDUCTORS AND RELATED DEVICES 
Acquirer: Orbit Semiconductor Inc. 
Sunnyvale, CA 
Target: Paradigm Technology Inc.( San Jose wafer plant) 
San Jose, CA 
Terms: Orbit Semiconductor acquired a wafer fabrication plant in San Jose  from Paradigm 
Technology for $20 million . Terms were $6.6 million in $5.8 million note. And the assumption 
of $ 7.6 million in liabilities. 
Completed:11/18/96 
Acquirer Business: Semiconductors that allow designers to manage specific integrated circuit 
development, production, scheduling and control. 
Target Business: Semiconductor wafers 
Notes: The first example illustrates a horizontal merger where the business of the acquired and acquirer firms are described by "close 
to identical phrases" as mentioned in the text. The activities of both firms  match and they are not complementary. Ansoft Corp., in 
this example, produces a slightly differentiated product of what MacNeal- Schwendler Corp. produces.   
 
The second example illustrates a merger which can be classified as "other".  The  businesses of the acquirer and acquired firms are not 
related in a vertical or horizontal way. 
   
The third example illustrates a vertical merger where the two businesses complement each other.  Semiconductors and wafer 
production are complementary  phases of  microelectronics business 
 
   10
Summary Statistics for the vertical versus horizontal classification in high and low-tech 
industries:                                           Table 2 
                                                       
Low-Tech Industry No:1 
 Food and Kindred Products [SIC 20]: 
Year       Total number of mergers    Percentage of  vertical mergers     Percentage of                   
                                                                                                                        horizontal mergers 
1993                    68                                          6 %                                       34 %  
 
1994                    56                                          3 %                                        32 %       
 
1995                   69                                           3%                                         39 %  
 
1996                   64                                           3%                                          47 %  
 
1997                   55                                            3%                                         38 %  
 
1998
a                16                                            0 %                                         37%   
Total                 328                                           3 %                                          37%  
                                                      Low-tech Industry No:2 
  Stone, Clay and Glass products [SIC 32]: 
Year       Total number of mergers    Percentage of  vertical mergers   Percentage of                   
                                                                                                                horizontal mergers 
1993                      16                                         12 %                                    37 %  
 
1994                     24                                          24 %                                    21 %  
 
1995                     12                                          2 %                                      5 %                                         
 
1996                     27                                         11%                                      44% 
 
1997                     27                                          11%                                      44% 
 
1998
a                    3                                         33%                                       66% 
Total:                 109                                         16%                                        50 % 
High-tech Industry 
 Electric and Electronic Equipment And Components Industry [SIC 36]: 
Year       Total number of mergers    Percentage of  vertical mergers   Percentage of                   
                                                                                                                horizontal mergers 
1993                 85                                                 29 %                                 28 %  
 
1994                96                                                 11 %                                  37 %  
 
1995                89                                                 29 %                                  28 %                                                  
 
1996               150                                                31 %                                  37% 
 
1997               150                                                31 %                                  37 %  
 
1998
a              18                                                22%                                   44% 
Total              588                                                31 %                                    28% 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Vertical Mergers                                            Horizontal Mergers 
 
 
Percentage of vertical mergers:  41 %                       Percentage of horizontal              
                                              mergers: 28 %  
 
Percentage of vertical                                Percentage of horizontal 
mergers which involve                                mergers which involve 
design stage (tacit) activities: 99 %            design stage (tacit) activities:60% 
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